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Abstract
This paper studies public provision of long term care insurance in a world in which
family assistance is (i) uncertain and (ii) endogenous depending on the time parents
spend raising their children. Public benets will be paid in case of disability but cannot
be combined with self-insurance or family aid. The benets are provided equally to
all recipients and nanced by a proportional payroll tax. The paper shows that tax
distortions imply that full insurance is undesirable. It characterizes the optimal tax and
identies the elements that determine its size. Of crucial importance are the extent of
under-insurance, the e¤ect of the tax on the probability of altruism, the distortionary
e¤ect of the tax, and, with wage heterogeneity, the covariance between the social mar-
ginal utility of lifetime income and (i) earnings (positive e¤ect) and (ii) the probability
of altruism default (negative e¤ect).
JEL classication: H2, H5.
Keywords: Long term care, uncertain altruism, endogenous probability, opting out,
public insurance.
1 Introduction
With life expectancy increasing in most countries, more and more people live longer and
enter a lifespan where dependency is no longer an infrequent occurrence. The 80-plus
population, people most at risk of su¤ering severe dependency and requiring long-term
care (LTC), is increasing faster than any other age group. The provision of LTC thus
represents a major challenge for most societies today and for decades to come. In these
societies, most of the older people in need of LTC services continue to rely on informal
home care or services provided by unpaid caregivers (usually nonprofessional family
members, friends or other volunteers). Estimates both for the US and Europe are in the
80 to 90 percent range. However, changing social patterns including smaller families,
mobility of the children and increased female labor force participation, are undermining
the familys role in LTC provision and contributing to an ever increasing demand for
formal care, whether public or private.1
It is important to point out that LTC is not the same things as health care. LTC
is the provision of assistance and services to people who, because of disabling illnesses
or conditions, have limited ability to perform basic daily activities such as bathing
and preparing meals. The import of this is that traditional LTC consists of mainly
custodial and non-skilled care. However, to address the often multiple chronic conditions
associated with older populations it increasingly involves also some level of medical care
that requires the expertise of skilled practitioners. Nevertheless long-term care can be
provided at home, in the community, in assisted living facilities or in nursing homes.
The increasing need for LTC services combined with the decreasing availability of
the family, the traditional provider of LTC, poses a huge economic challenge to our
societies. It inicts a pressing demand on the other two LTC providers the market
and the state to o¤er either a substitute or a complement to what the family has thus
far been providing by way of long term care.
1For a survey on LTC, see Cremer et al. (2012a) and Grabowski et al. (2012).
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In this paper we study the role of social insurance and its appropriate design in a
setting wherein family solidarity is unreliable. In other words, children may provide
care to their dependant parents but this is not for certain. There are multiple reasons
for this. They are demographic (childless families), societal (declining family norms),
economic (increasing labor participation of women who in the past used to help their
dependent parents). Whatever the reason, the possibility of solidarity default requires
people to take appropriate steps such as purchasing private insurance, self-insuring and
relying on public insurance or assistance schemes.
The uncertain nature of family aid is not just relevant within the context of LTC.
It also has interesting implications for other public policy questions. These include
the design of retirement policy (Chabbakatri et al., 1993), and their political support
(Leroux and Pestieau, 2013). Now this literature has shown that uncertain altruism
increases retirement savings and enhances the support for pension schemes. But in
industrialized countries, family solidarity is not the main mechanism for retirement
support any more. On the other hand, family solidarity remains the main channel for
the provision of LTC. A thorough study of the implications of uncertainty in this context
is therefore of crucial importance.
To study the role and design of public LTC provision in a framework where family
aid is uncertain, we consider a single generation of parents over their (two-period)
life cycle. In the rst period, they work, consume, and save for their retirement. In
the second period, they are retired and may become dependent. The probability of
this dependency is exogenously given. If a parent becomes dependent, a second source
of uncertainly kicks in. Parents may not necessarily receive aid from their children.
Moreover, this source of uncertainty is not exogenously given. Parents can inuence it
through investment of their time instilling family values in their children and in this
way fostering family solidarity.2
2See on this Kotliko¤ and Spivak (1981) or Cox and Stark (2005).
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In studying the properties of a public LTC scheme, we focus on one generations
lifecycle. Members of this generation live two periods: a period of work and a period of
retirement which can also be a period of dependency. They are also the ones who bear
the cost of nancing the LTC program which they do during their period of activity. No
tax is imposed on their children to pay for their parentsLTC provision. In this way, we
circumvent the issues associated with inter-generational wealth transfers. The role of
children in our model is limited to their decision with regard to providing assistance to
their parents. As a consequence, the welfare of the grown-up children does not gure in
governments objective function; social welfare accounts only for the expected lifecycle
utility of parents. Formally, we treat the children as if they live abroad and may or
may not send remittances to their disabled parents. Naturally, this is an image. We
realize that most children live in the same country as their parents and if they help their
parents in case of dependency, they do it in various ways (time, money, housing). We
just want to simplify the analysis by excluding the children from the welfare function
used by the central planner.
Throughout the paper, we shall rule out private insurance markets. The main reason
for this is that private insurance markets are not viable in this setting. Specically, what
is needed here is insurance against dependency and the failure of altruism. Now while
private markets can typically provide insurance against dependency, this is not possible
against altruism default (and to our knowledge no such coverage is ever provided).
The problem is, of course, that such a scheme raises enormous moral hazard problems.
The government, on the contrary, will have the possibility of indirectly covering against
altruism default by awarding benets that are mutually exclusive with family assistance.
More explicitly, all dependent parents are entitled to a limited care facility if they
want one. They also have the option of not asking for one using instead their own
resources, and those of their children, to purchase whatever home care services they
need (without any help from the government).
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It is clear that with the increasing needs for LTC, a broader involvement of the
markets would me most welcome. However, the current functioning of LTC insurance
market and its prospects does not lead to much optimism. In other words, the LTC
insurance is as discrete in reality as it is in our setting. In a recent paper reporting the
relation between public and private LTC expenditure in the European Union, Lipszyc
et al. (2012) show that most EU Member States display low private-to-public ratios
expenditure. Big public spenderslike the Netherlands and Sweden exhibit extremely
low private shares of expenditure (respectively 0 and less than 1%), and Denmark shows
a ratio of LTC expenditure around 9 (private) to 91 (public). More problematic for
dependent people in need of long-term care are countries like Romania or the Czech
Republic, with only 0.6-0.8% of GDP publicly spent on LTC and no private expenditure
reported. This underdevelopment of LTC private insurance which goes against simple
theoretical predictions constitutes what is now commonly called the LTC insurance
puzzle. The reasons for this puzzle have been analyzed by Brown and Finkelstein
(2007) and Pestieau and Ponthière (2011). These authors distinguish between, on the
one hand, factors based on perfect rationality (moral hazard, adverse selection, state
related utilities), and, on the other hand, factors that rely behavioral imperfections
(myopia, denial).
It is important to point out that it is the opting out feature of public provision
that gives it an edge over private insurance markets. Public provision schemes that
allow topping out do not enjoy this edge as they will be provided to all dependent
parents and not just those who do not receive aid from their children. In a companion
paper, Cremer et al. (2012) compare the two schemes. However, that paper treats
the probability of altruism to be exogenous and allows for no heterogeneity amongst
parents. Given these assumptions, the opting out scheme can, under some conditions,
achieve an e¢ cient outcome with full insurance. This is not possible when the default
of altruism is endogenous. Parents can increase the likelihood of getting help from their
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children by spending more time with them. This creates a tradeo¤ for the parents
between spending more time with their children versus more time working. The former
increases the probability of having assistance in case of dependency, and the latter
generates more labor income. We show that this trade-o¤ will have a negative impact
on the optimal level of insurance. Whereas our opting out scheme calls for full insurance
when the probability of altruism is xed, it will call for less than full insurance with an
endogenous probability of altruism.
By introducing income heterogeneity amongst agents, we extend Cremer et al.
(2012) in yet another direction. This leads to additional inuences on the optimal
tax rate. With identical individuals, the tax reects three considerations. One is the
extent of under-insurance which tends to increase the tax. The second is the e¤ect of the
tax on the probability of altruism which is also positive. The third is the distortionary
e¤ect of the tax; this tends to lower the tax. Heterogeneity brings about two additional
considerations. Both are related to the redistributive objective. While the rst is sim-
ilar to a traditional linear income tax e¤ect (because a uniform benet is nanced via
a proportional income tax) and tends to increase the tax, the second term has a neg-
ative e¤ect on the tax and is specic to the structure of the underlying LTC provision
scheme. The reason is that the higher productivity parents benet more from the public
assistance program making the system regressive. This may appear surprising at rst
but it arises because these individuals face a higher probability of being abandoned by
their children; the opportunity cost of their time being higher, they invest less time in
their children.
Following the tradition established in many optimal taxation models, we start by the
case where individuals are ex ante identical. This simplies the exposition and allows
us to present an otherwise quite complex setting in the most reader-friendly way. In
addition it claries the relative roles of arguments based on e¢ ciency and those triggered
by redistributive objectives.
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2 The model with identical individuals
We concentrate on a single generation of parents and consider a two period setting. In
period 1 the young working parent and a child coexist, but the parent makes all the
decisions. In period 2, the parent is old and retired while the child is now a working
adult who makes his decisions. Parents face two types of uncertainty. First, in old age
they may be either dependent or autonomous. The probability of dependency is
exogenous and denoted by . Second, the parents are uncertain about the perspective of
obtaining help from their children in case they will be dependent in the second period.
The probability that a child helps his dependent parent, p, is endogenous. It varies
positively with the time parents spend raising their children, T . Consequently, with a
probability of 1  p(T ), children abandontheir parents in the sense that they do not
provide them with any family LTC.
Parentsconsumption when young and old is denoted by c and d respectively. Parents
allocate their T units of time between caring for their children, T , and market labor,
T   T . Both usages of time bear no disutility. Preferences are quasilinear, with a
constant marginal utility of rst period consumption.
Denote the LTC services parents consume by x. These take either of two forms.
One is home or nursing care provided, or nanced, by children or the dependentsown
resources. The other is the government provision of a limited facility. Government
service cannot be topped up so that the two types of service are mutually exclusive.
Governments provision, z, is nanced by a proportional tax on the parents wage w, at
rate  . The savings, s, of the recipientsof the government service are also taxed away.
Altruistic children give their parents a level of aid a. Consequently we have x =
s+ a for parents who receive aid from their children and x = z for the beneciaries of
government assistance. The level of aid is chosen by the children who, in the process,
also choose between their own aid versus government assistance.
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The parents expected utility is given by,
EU = w (1  )  T   T   s+ (1  )U (s) +
 [p (T )H (s+ a) + (1  p (T ))H (z)] : (1)
This specication already integrates the life cycle budget constraint and assumes that
the interest rate is zero. Children also have quasilinear preferences represented by
u = yc   a+ H (x) ; (2)
where yc represents their exogenous income while  is their degree of altruism. When
 = 0 the child is not altruistic.
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, the government sets its policy
instruments z and  . In stage 2, parents choose T and s. Finally, in stage 3, children
choose the level of assistance a. At each stage there is full commitment. We solve this
game by backward induction starting with the last stage when the grown-up children
decide on the extent of their help to their parents, if any.
2.1 Stage 3: The childs choice
Dene
a = argmax
a
= yc   a+ H (s+ a) ;
that is the level of aid that an altruistic child provides if the parent does not consume
government provided LTC service z. Dening
m ()   H 0 1 1


; (3)
we have3
a = m ()  s: (4)
3 If s is too large, a = 0; this is uninteresting and we will rule it out.
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Altruistic children choose a if and only if it gives them more utility than the option
of no assistance in which case the parent consumes z. Consequently, they compare
u = yc   a + H (s+ a) ; (5)
with
u = yc + H (z) : (6)
The child is indi¤erent between these alternatives if
H (z) = H (s+ a)  a


= H (m ())  m ()  s


: (7)
Let bz denote the solution to equation (7). The childrens choice then simply depends
on the comparison of z and bz. If z  bz altruistic children prefer to provide their own
aid a, rather than entrust their parents to public assistance. On the other hand when
z > bz, altruistic children provide no aid. For all practical purposes this yields the same
outcome as the one achieved under failure of altruism. In the remainder of the paper we
concentrate on the equilibrium under which altruistic children provide aid a.4 Recall
that this occurs with probability p(T ).
Using (5)(6) it follows that
H (s+ a) H (z) > a= > 0;
so that s+a > z. In other words, parents of altruistic children consume a higher level of
LTC services then the parents who are abandoned by their o¤spring. Interestingly, this
implies that parents who receive aid from their children will never ask the government
for help. Put di¤erently, the program is self-targeted.
4The compagnion paper Cremer et al. (2012b) takes a closer look at the case where optimal policy
implies a level of z > bz, such that even altruistic children decide to provide no aid. This occurs when
the parameter of altruism, , is small.
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2.2 Stage 2: The parents choice
The expected utility of the parent in period one is equal to
EU = w (1  )  T   T   s+ (1  )U (s) +  [p (T )H (m ()) + (1  p (T ))H (z)] :
(8)
The parent chooses s and T in order to maximize his expected utility. It follows from
the rst-order conditions of this problem, and assuming an interior solution for s and
T  that,5
(1  )U 0 (s) = 1; (9)
p0 (T ) =
w (1  )
 [H (m ()) H (z)] : (10)
Equation (9) implies that the parents saving is xed. It increases with (1  ) but
does not vary with the tax  and government provision z. There is undersaving: in
choosing s the individual parent considers that it has no e¤ect on his welfare in case
of dependency. This is because any extra saving accumulated by the dependent elderly
will be crowded out by a one-to-one decrease in childrensaid when this is provided.
Alternatively, when there is no aid, savings are taxed away. On the other hand, we have
from (10) that the time spent with children varies with  and z: T  = T  ( ; z). To
determine the direction of these variations, di¤erentiate (10) partially with respect to 
and z. This yields
@T 
@
=
 w
 [H (m ()) H (z)] p00 (T ) > 0; (11)
@T 
@z
=
w (1  )H 0 (z)
 [H (m ()) H (z)]2 p00 (T ) < 0: (12)
5Observe that an interior solution for s is ensured as long as marginal utility of consumption is high
at low consumption levels. However, to have an interior solution for T , it must be the case that
@ (EU=@T ) jT=0 > 0: That is,
H (m ()) H (z) > w (1  )
p0 (0)
:
Otherwise, T  = 0:
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Intuitively, an increase in  lowers the opportunity cost of spending time with children.
This substitution e¤ect has no countervailing income e¤ect given our quasilinear spec-
ication so that T  increases. On the other hand, an increase in z lowers the value of
spending time with children and one reduces T :
2.3 Stage 1: Optimal policy
The governments budget constraint is now written as
w
 
T   T  =  [1  p (T )] (z   s) ; (13)
where T  = T  ( ; z) : The government chooses z to maximize
$  w (1  )  T   T   s + (1  )U (s) + (14)
 [p (T )H (m ()) + (1  p (T ))H (z)] ;
while allowing  to adjust to variation in z according to equation (13). Di¤erentiating
$ with respect to z; using the envelope theorem, yields
d$
dz
=
@$
@z

T 
+
@$
@

T 
d
dz
=  [1  p (T )]H 0 (z)  w  T   T  d
dz
=  [1  p (T )]

H 0 (z)  z   s


d
dz

: (15)
Totally di¤erentiating (13) with respect to z and deriving an expression for d=dz, we
show in the Appendix that
d$
dz
=  [1  p (T )]
 
h
1  p0(T )(z s) w[1 p(T )] @T

@z
i
+

1 + p
0(T )(z s) w
w(T T )
@T 
@

H 0 (z)
1 + p
0(T )(z s) w
w(T T )
@T 
@
;
(16)
The optimal value of z is found by setting the expression for d$=dz in (16) equal to
zero. We have
1  p
0 (T ) (z   s)  w
 [1  p (T )]
@T 
@z
=
"
1 +
p0 (T ) (z   s)  w
w
 
T   T  @T @
#
H 0 (z) : (17)
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Equation (17) tells us that at the optimum value of z the marginal costs and benets of
a budget-balance increase in  are equal. The left-hand side shows the net cost of raising
one dollar through an increase in  : This is less than one because of the endogeneity of
T . The reason is that the concomitant increase in z as  increases, lowers T  resulting
in a further increase in the governments tax revenue, thus reducing the net cost of
raising a dollar from one. The right-hand side shows the net benet of spending that
dollar on z: Endogeneity of T  also implies net benets that falls short of H 0 (z). With
endogeneity, an increase in  increases T  so that the government raises less than a
dollar to nance z.
Observe that in this interpretation, we have implicitly assumed that
p0 (T ) (z   s)  w < 0: (18)
To see the reason for this, consider the e¤ect of increasing  while keeping z constant on
the governments budget surplusw
 
T   T    [1  p (T )] (z   s) : This is equal
to
w
 
T   T + p0 (T ) (z   s)  w @T 
@
:
The component of this expression that arises due to endogeneity of T  consists of
two parts. One is a negative e¤ect on the tax base as T  increases; this is equal to
 w (@T =@). The other is a positive e¤ect. As T  increases, p (T ) increases and the
government needs to support less people; this is given by p0 (T ) (z   s) (@T =@).
Inequality (18) states that the rst e¤ect dominates the second.
Finally, the endogeneity of T implies less than full insurance under the opting out
scheme when we had full insurance with exogenous T . To see this, rearrange the opti-
mality condition (17) and rewrite it as
H 0 (z)  1 =   p0 (T ) (z   s)  w " 1
 [1  p (T )]
@T 
@z
+
H 0 (z)
w
 
T   T  @T @
#
: (19)
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By substituting the expressions for @T =@ and @T =@z, from (11) and (12), in (19)
followed by a bit of algebraic manipulations, we prove in the Appendix that
H 0 (z)  1 =   [p
0 (T ) (z   s)  w]2H 0 (z) 
T   T   [H (m ()) H (z)]2 p00 (T ) (1  )p0 (T ) > 0: (20)
Observe also that from (16),
d$
dz

z=s
=  [1  p (T )] H 0 (s)  1 > 0:
Consequently, H 0 (s) > 1 ensures g = z  s > 0 and  > 0; we assume this is the case.
2.4 Stage 1: Optimal policy revisited
For the sake of interpretation, we present an alternative way of designing the optimal
LTC policy. We express the governments problem by the Lagrangian
$  w (1  ) ( T   T )  s + (1  )U (s) + (21)
 [p (T )H (m ()) + (1  p (T ))H (z)] +


w( T   T )   (1  p (T )) (z   s) :
The rst-order conditions of the governments problem with respect to  and z, using
the envelope theorem, are
@$
@
= w (  1) ( T   T )   w    (z   s) p0 (T ) @T 
@
= 0;
@$
@z
=  (1  p (T )) H 0 (z)     w    (z   s) p0 (T ) @T 
@z
= 0:
Substituting for  (z   s) from the governments budget constraint (13) in the above
rst-order conditions, one can rewrite them as
@T 
@
=
  (  1) ( T   T )

h
L
1 p(T )p
0 (T )  1
i ; (22)
@T 
@z
=
  (1  p (T )) [H 0 (z)  ]
w
h
L
1 p(T )p
0 (T )  1
i : (23)
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Let T c denote the compensated education time in an exercise in which when 
changes, z is adjusted to hold the parents expected utility constant. We have
@T c
@
=
@T 
@
+
@T 
@z
dz
d

EU
:
Observe that @T c=@ is not an ordinary compensated derivative. This is because
the compensation is achieved through a variation in z, rather than in income as is the
case for the standard Hicksian demand. Consequently, we cannot use duality theory to
prove @T c=@ < 0. To obtain this property additional restriction are needed, as shown
in Appendix C.
Di¤erentiating equation (21) with respect to  and letting z adjust to keep EU
constant results in6
dz
d
jEU = w(
T   T )
(1  p (T ))H 0(z) : (24)
Substituting in the expression for @T c=@ leads to
@T c
@
=
@T 
@
+
w( T   T )
(1  p (T ))H 0(z)
@T 
@z
: (25)
Finally, substituting the expressions for @T =@ and @T =@z from (22)(23) and rear-
ranging the terms, we get
 =
h
1  1H0(z)
i
( T   T )h
1  T T 1 p(T )p0 (T )
i
@T c
@
: (26)
Even though our model concerns homogeneous individuals, this characterization is
similar to that in the optimal linear income tax problem à la Sheshinski (1972). As in
6We have
d$
d
=
@$
@
+
@$
@z
dz
d
jEU = 0:
Consequently,
dz
d
jEU =  
@$
@
@$
@z
=  
@$
@
js;T + @$@s @s

@
+ @$
@T
@T
@
@$
@z
js;T + @$@s @s

@z
+ @$
@T
@T
@z
=    w(
T   T )
 (1  p (T ))H 0 (z) :
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that problem, the denominator reects e¢ ciency considerations. The numerator reects
insurance considerations. In noting this analogy, observe also that7
1  (
T   T )
1  p (T )p
0 (T ) > 0;
and recall that (19) implies H 0(z) > 1. A positive solution for  (and thus for z) requires
@T c=@ > 0.
We will see in the next section that this characterization is preserved when we
introduce heterogeneous agents but equity terms also enter the picture.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 1 Assume there is no private insurance, governments assistance cannot
be topped up, and the probability of a child helping his parents in case of dependency
depends positively on the time the parents spend with that child when growing up.
(i) Optimal private savings s and time spent with children T  are characterized
by equations (9)(10). While s is xed and depends only on the exogenously given
probability of dependency, , T  varies positively with the tax rate  and negatively with
government provision z.
(ii) Assuming H 0 (s) > 1, private savings are insu¢ cient to satisfy long term care
needs of the parents. The government should tax the labor income of the parents and
use its proceeds to provide long term care for those who are not helped by their children.
(iii) The optimal value of z is characterized by the optimality condition (17).
(iv) There should be less than full insurance so that at the optimum,
H 0 (z) > 1:
7We have from the governments budget constraint (13) that
 (z   s) = w(
T   T )
1  p (T ) :
Substituting in inequality (18),
p0 (T )
w( T   T )
1  p (T )   w < 0:
Simplifying leads to the indicated inequality.
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(v) Equation (26) characterizes the optimal  .
3 Heterogeneous individuals
We now turn to the case where individuals have di¤erent wages or productivities. Indi-
viduals of type i have a wage of wi and represent a proportion ni of the total population
(the size of which is normalized to one). The game played within each family is exactly
the same as in the previous section. Consequently, T i and s

i are determined as de-
scribed in Subsection 2.1 and 2.2 and all the properties and expressions derived there
continue to apply (except, of course that an index i has to be added where appropriate).
Three remarks are in order. First, quasi-linearity assumptions imply that, whenever
children help their parents, xi = si +ai = m (). Additionally, s

i is determined through
equation (9) independently of income so that si = s
. Second, we assume a at rate
benet z that is independent of the level of contributions wi( T  T i ) and only awarded
to the parents who do not benet from family solidarity. The restriction to at benets
appears to be a natural assumption in this setting since savings of the beneciaries are
taxed away, so that means-testing becomes irrelevant.8
As in the previous section, we continue to have xi = z if LTC insurance is provided
by the government (and xi = s+ a = m () if it is provided by the altruistic children).
In either case, LTC consumption remains the same across all dependent parents with
di¤erent income levels. What varies amongst them is the time they spend with their
children and thus their labor supply as well as their present day consumption levels.
Third, to introduce a concern for redistribution, we consider a social welfare function
that is a concave transformation of the parentsquasilinear utilities. That is, we will
work with V (EUi), as opposed to EUi, where EUi denotes the (expected) lifecycle
utility of a parent with productivity wi and V () is a concave transformation. Observe
8Means testing otherwise be a way to implement nonlinear policies. The design of nonlinear LTC
has been studied in a di¤erent setting by Pestieau and Sato (2008).
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also that EUi is given by (8) as in the homogeneous individuals case, but indexed i for
wage wi.
Next, before setting up the governments optimization problem, to avoid cluttered
expressions, we introduce some additional notations that will simplify the presentation.
We use H 0 for H 0(z), yi for wi
 
T   T i

and pi for p(T i ). Similar to the homogeneous
individuals case, let T ci denote the compensated leisure when  changes and z is adjusted
to hold the parent is expected utility constant. We can then write
@T ci
@
=
@T i
@
+
@T i
@z
dz
d

EUi
:
Introduce
Ci  dz
d

EUi
=
yi
(1  pi)H 0 :
to measure the amount of z one needs to give to parent i as a result of an increase in 
to keep his lifetime utility EUi constant.9 We can then rewrite the previous expression
as
@T ci
@
=
@T i
@
+ Ci
@T i
@z
: (27)
Next introduce
C 
P
niyi
H 0
P
ni(1  pi) :
This is the sum of the numerator of Ci divided by the sum of the denominator ( C is not
equal to
P
niCi of course). Adding ( C   Ci)@T i =@ to both sides of (27), we obtain
@T ci
@
+
@T i
@z
( C   Ci) = @T

i
@
+ C
@T i
@z
 @
Ti
@
(28)
Observe that @ Ti=@ is yet another compensated derivative derived from @T ci =@ by
adding to it one more compensation term equal to the di¤erence between C (@T i =@z)
9This term is the same as the expression (24) in the homogeneous individuals case, only indexed by
parent i.
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and Ci (@T i =@z). While @T
c
i =@ is interpreted as compensated variation it is not a
standard derivative of an Hicksian demand function.10 Consequently its sign appears
to be ambiguous. We have assumed that it is positive which can be considered as the
normal and intuitive case.11 As to @ Ti=@ , it will have the same sign as @T ci =@ if
we have a rather homogenous society. We are now ready to set up the governments
optimization problem.
The Lagrangian expression of the government is given by
L2 =
X
nifV [wi(1  )( T   T i )  s + (1  )u(s) (29)
+p(T i )H(m ()) + (1  p(T i ))H(z)] + (wi( T   T i )  (1  p(T i ))(z   s)g:
Di¤erentiating (29) while making use of the envelope theorem yields the following rst-
order conditions
@L2
@
=
X
ni

  V 0(EUi)

yi   

wi   p0i(z   s)
 @T i
@

= 0; (30)
@L2
@z
=
X
ni

V 0(EUi)H 0   

(1  pi)  

wi   p0i(z   s)
 @T i
@z

= 0: (31)
Appendix D shows that rst-order conditions (30)(31) can be combined as follows
@L2
@
+
@L2
@z
C =  E  V 0(EU) y   (1  p) E (y)
E (1  p)

+ 

H 0   1
H 0

E (y)
  E
 
w
@ T
@
!
+ (z   s)E
 
p0
@ T
@
!
= 0; (32)
where the operator E is used for the expected value(frequency-weighted summation
over i). Introducing the cov() notation, familiar from the optimal linear income tax
10 In other words it is not the second order derivative of a convenitonaly dened expenditure function.
11Our expressions are valid irrespective of the sign of this term. When it is negative the interpretation
changes even though the basic logic remains the same. To avoid repetition and since this case does not
appear to be intuitively appealing, we have decided not to address it explicitly.
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literature, we can rewrite expression (32) as
  cov(V 0; y) + E (y)
E (1  p) cov(V
0; (1  p))
+ 

H 0   1
H 0

E (y)  E
 
w
@ T
@
!
+ (z   s)E
 
p0
@ T
@
!
= 0;
or
 =
  cov(V 0; y) + E(y)E(1 p) cov(V 0; (1  p)) + 

H0 1
H0

E (y) + (z   s)E

p0 @ T@

E

w @
T
@
 :
(33)
In interpreting this formula, one caveat is in order. While expression (33) is valid
regardless of the sign of the compensated derivative @ T=@ , its interpretation (and more
fundamentally the existence of an interior solution) do depend on the sign of @ T=@ . In
the linear optimal income tax problem, the sign of @T c=@ is unambiguously positive.
This appears to be the reasonable case here as well; however, one cannot rule out
the theoretical possibility of a negative sign for it; see Subsection 2.4 and Appendix C).
Consequently, one cannot be certain about the sign of @ Ti=@ either. Nevertheless we
shall concentrate on the case where @ Ti=@ > 0 which is the reasonablecase, consis-
tent with the traditional deadweight loss terms in optimal tax expressions. However,
one has to keep in mind that this is an assumption and not a result. The relevance of
our results have to be qualied accordingly.
First observe that when individuals are identical the covariance terms in (33) vanish
while from the denitions of Ci and C, Ci = C so that from (27) @ Ti=@ = @T c=@ .
Consequently, (33) simplies to
 =

H0 1
H0

y + (z   s)p0 @T c@
w @T
c
@
=

H0 1
H0

y
w @T
c
@
+
(z   s)p0
w
: (34)
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One can easily show that (34) is equivalent to (26), the expression obtained in the
previous section for the homogeneous individuals case.12 We start by interpreting the
terms that appear in (26), or equivalently (34), and are present even when there is no
heterogeneity among parents. Then we proceed with the interpretation of the terms
that appear because of heterogeneity.
There are three terms. First is the insurance gap (H 0   1) > 0; the larger this gap
the higher is the tax.13 Second is the positive e¤ect of the tax on the probability of
solidarity; this makes the public provision of LTC less costly and leads to a higher tax.
Third is the distortionary e¤ect of the tax on leisure, @T c=@ , lowering tax revenues;
this calls for a lower tax rate.14
Next turning to the general formula (33), there are two additional covariance terms
pertaining to the redistributive role of the public scheme. First, there is the covariance
between the social utility of income and earnings: cov(V 0; y) < 0; this is the classical
term of the linear income tax model. Given that it appears with a negative sign in the
formula, it has a positive e¤ect on the level of the tax. This is not surprising in that
a uniform benet is nanced via a proportional income tax (similar to the demogrant
of the linear income tax). Second, there is the covariance between the social utility
of income and the probability of altruism default. One would expect that the more
12 In (34) substitute w
 
T   T  for y, w  T   T  = [1  p (T )] for  (z   s) ; from the governments
budget constraint (13), and simplify. This yields
 =

H0 1
H0
  
T   T 
@T c
@
+

 
T   T  p0
1  p (T ) :
Collecting the terms involving  ; and solvingfor  , leads to (26).
13 In the previous section we have shown the H 0 > 1 is always true with homogenous individuals. With
heterogenous individuals overinsurance (H 0 < 1) can strictly speaking no longer be ruled out (especially
when heterogeneity is very signicant so that redistributive benets of z are very large). However, such
overinsurance is in any even hard to reconcile with our assumption that altruistic children help their
dependent parents. Which overinsurance in public provision, this would only be possible for a very
large level of . None of these complications appear to be intuitively or empirically appealing and so
we assume H 0 > 1.
14Recall that we assume @T c=@ > 0.
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productive parents are more likely to be abandoned by their children. This follows from
the fact that they face a higher opportunity cost in spending time with their children.
Consequently, one would expect cov(V 0; (1  p)) < 0 so that this term tends to decrease
the level of  : Put di¤erently, to the extent that it is the high-income dependents, rather
than low-income dependents, who demand the public benet redistributive concerns call
for a smaller tax.
We also note that with a quasi-linear utility, the negative incidence of w on T
is stronger than if the utility for rst period consumption were strictly concave. In
the rst case, only the opportunity cost of education prevails; in the second case, the
decreasing marginal utility will partially o¤set this negative e¤ect.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a redistributive version of the LTC public scheme of Proposi-
tion 1 consisting of a uniform benet and a payroll tax. The public benet is granted to
dependent elderly who do not benet from family help. Individuals di¤er in earnings and
the tax has a positive e¤ect on the time devoted to children. We show that the optimal
payroll tax depends on ve terms (and their sign is given under the assumption that
time spent with children increases with the tax rate): (i) the extent of under-insurance
(positive), (ii) the e¤ect of the tax on the probability of altruism (positive), (iii) the
distortionary e¤ect of the tax (negative), (iv) the covariance between the social marginal
utility of lifetime income and earnings (positive), and (v) the covariance between the
social marginal utility of lifetime income and the probability of altruism default (nega-
tive).
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied public provision of long term care insurance in a world in which
family assistance is (i) uncertain and (ii) endogenous depending on the time parents
20
spend raising their children. The increasing unreliability of families as the primary
source of LTC provision is due to many factors. Some are exogenous but others are
not and can be inuenced by how parents raise their children. Inculcating a sense of
family solidarity through spending time with them is a case in point. The paper has
been mainly concerned with the implications of this factor. Another focus of the paper,
hitherto unexplored, has been the implications of income heterogeneity amongst families
for the design of a public insurance scheme.
We have adopted a rather simple framework with a linear payroll tax that nances
a LTC at rate benet. This benet while accessible to all dependent parents is self
targeted such that only the disabled parents who are deprived from receiving aid from
their children opt for it. Initially, to focus solely on the endogeneity issue, the paper
has considered a setup with parents of identical productivities. Parents devoting time
educating their children and shaping their values can mitigate the altruism default. This
education time is diverted from market labor and therefore implies a tax distortion that
makes provision of full insurance LTC undesirable. The optimal tax formula in this case
is a trade-o¤ between three consideration: under-insurance which tends to increase the
tax, the e¤ect of the tax on the probability of altruism which also increases the tax and
the distortionary e¤ect which tends to lower the tax.
Introducing earnings heterogeneity amongst parents, the paper has drawn attention
to two other factors related to the governments redistributive objective. One is the pres-
ence of the covariance between the social utility of income and earnings with a negative
sign; an e¤ect present in the traditional linear income tax model calling for a higher tax
rate. The other is the presence of the covariance between the social utility of income
and the probability of altruism defaults appearing with a positive sign. It has a damp-
ening e¤ect on the size of the optimal tax. This consideration is new and arises from
the interaction between endogeneity of the default of altruism and heterogeneity. The
point is that more productive parents have a higher opportunity cost of time and tend
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to invest less time in their children. As a result, they face a higher probability of being
abandoned by their children. They will thus benet more from the public assistance
program making the system regressive. Given this inherent regressivity, redistributive
concerns call for a smaller tax.
To draw the policy implications of our nding, it might be useful to come back to
the reality we are facing. Because of aging, particularly very old aging (80+), the needs
for LTC should increase in the near future. At the same time, the main supplier of LTC
services, namely the family, is experiencing a number of problems in terms of generosity
and reliability. In particular, it seems that the number of elderly who cannot count
on the assistance of a close relative (spouse, child) in case of dependency is increasing.
Given that there is little hope to see the market for LTC taking o¤ soon and given
that anyway such market would not be able to insure individuals against default of
altruism, one has to fall back on the state. By starting with individuals that are ex ante
identical we have shown that public intervention was likely to be desirable, particularly
when it is possible to prevent individuals from combining private and public benets
(i.e., use an opting out type policy). When we add heterogeneity, the case for a public
insurance for LTC is reinforced as it contributes also to redistribution. In those times
of budgetary austerity it might be inappropriate to call for more public intervention.
However one can wish that existing public involvement be more consistent and better
targeted. According to Lipszyc et al. (2012) in a number of countries public authorities
are already devoting a non-negligible share of their revenues to LTC. The problem is that
di¤erent layers of governments do it in an unorganized way. More importantly, public
LTC programs often allow for topping up public benets with private ones, which is
clearly costlier and does not allow for correctly compensating the elderly dependent who
do not benet from family solidarity. Going in that direction would be socially desirable
on both equity and e¢ ciency grounds.
Among themes for future research, one could think of enriching the tax instruments
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allowing for nonlinear income taxes. Another is to consider circumstances where in-
dividuals di¤er not only in earnings but also in the tightness of family solidarity and
in the probability of dependency. In such a case, the correlation between those two
individual characteristics would be crucial. Finally, following Cremer et al. (2012b) it
would be interesting to study to what extent private insurance could be a complement
or substitute to public intervention. As mentioned above private insurance does not
cover the risk of altruism default, a type of insurance which public LTC granted on
an opting out basis can e¤ectively provide. However, when it is actuarially fair (or at
least associated with small loading costs) and if at the same time we have a huge tax
distortion, there would be a case for a mix of private and public insurance.
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Appendix
A Derivation of (16)
First, totally di¤erentiate (13) with respect to z to get an expression for d=dz: We
have,
d
dz
w
 
T   T   wdT 
dz
=  p0 (T ) dT

dz
(z   s) +  [1  p (T )] ; (A1)
where
dT 
dz
 @T

@z
+
@T 
@
d
dz
: (A2)
Substituting from (A2) into (A1) and solving for d=dz yields
d
dz
=
 [1  p (T )]  [p0 (T ) (z   s)  w] (@T =@z)
w
 
T   T + [p0 (T ) (z   s)  w] (@T =@) : (A3)
Next, substitute for d=dz from (A3) in (15) and simplify, using the governments
budget constraint (13), to get
d$
dz
=  [1  p (T )]
"
w
 
T   T H 0 (z)   [1  p (T )] (z   s) +  
w
 
T   T +  [p0 (T ) (z   s)  w] (@T =@)
#
=  [1  p (T )]
24 H 0 (z)  1 +  w(T T )
1 + p
0(T )(z s) w
w(T T )
@T 
@
35 ; (A4)
where
   p0 (T ) (z   s)  w H 0 (z) @T 
@
+ (z   s) @T

@z

:
Substituting the value of   in (A4), using the governments budget constraint (13), after
simplications one arrives at (16).
B Derivation of (20)
Substitute the expressions for @T =@ and @T =@z; from (11) and (12) in the last brack-
eted expression on the right-hand side of (19), while also substituting for  [1  p (T )]
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from the governments budget constraint (13), and for  [H (m ()) H (z)] from equa-
tion (10). We have
1
 [1  p (T )]
@T 
@z
+
H 0 (z)
w
 
T   T  @T @ =
1
w
 
T   T 

(z   s)

@T 
@z
+H 0 (z)
@T 
@

=
1 
T   T  H 0 (z) [H (m ()) H (z)]2 p00 (T ) f(z   s) (1  )   [H (m ()) H (z)]g =
1 
T   T  H 0 (z) [H (m ()) H (z)]2 p00 (T ) (1  )p0 (T ) p0 (T ) (z   s)  w :
Substituting this expression in (19) yields (20).
C The sign of @Lc=@
Substituting for @L=@ and @L=@z from (11)(12) in (25),
@Lc
@
=
w
 [H (m ()) H (z)] p00 (T )  
wL
(1  p (T ))H 0(z)
w (1  )H 0 (z)
 [H (m ()) H (z)]2 p00 (T )
=
w
 [H (m ()) H (z)] p00 (T )

1  wL

(1  p (T ))H 0(z)
(1  )H 0 (z)
[H (m ()) H (z)]

To obtain @T c=@ < 0 we must have @Lc=@ < 0; which in turn requires
1 >
wL
(1  p (T ))
(1  )
[H (m ()) H (z)] ;
or
1   < (1  p (T
)) [H (m ()) H (z)]
wL
:
We also have
wL =  [1  p (T )] (z   s)
)
1   < 
z   s [H (m ()) H (z)]
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)
1  

<
H (m ()) H (z)
z   s
)
1

<
z   s +H (m ()) H (z)
z   s
)
 >
z   s
z   s +H (m ()) H (z) ;
which is not necessarily satised.
D Derivation of expression (32)
Using equations (30)(31), one obtains
@L2
@
+
@L2
@z
C =
X
i
ni



yi   (1  pi)
P
i niyi
H 0
P
i ni(1  pi)

 V 0(EUi)

yi   (1  pi)
P
i niyiP
i ni(1  pi)

 
X
i
ni

[wi   pi(z   s)] @Ti
@

:
Using the operator E, this yields (32).
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